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Abstract
This paper seeks to paint a picture of how discernible links between Althusser and Foucault can assist us to
theorise the life of cultural subjects inside established and emergent liberal-capitalist states. Althusser's
querying of a humanistic foundation to political philosophy and the social contract is connected to Foucault's
contention that modernity invented the subject as a centre of inquiry and that centre became the site
constructing obedient citizens.
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Civic Culture 
By the nineteenth century, notions of civility, of how to be a citizen, 
are widespread in Western Europe. They inhabit civil society, what 
Foucault named "the great fantasy . . . of a social body constituted by 
the universality of wills" ("Body/Power" 55). Civil society lies beyond 
the family, clan or area but short of the state. Its institutions animate the 
economy, religion, intellectual life and political parties (but not the 
parliament or executive government). They are linked via a mutual 
understanding of civil manners. The civil subject exists within this 
space. 
In the late twentieth century, there is renewed interest in identifying 
the networks that make for the civility that organizes this society. The 
motivation for such a turn comes from two sources. Firstly, it is a 
response by Western intellectuals and policy-makers to the chaos of life 
in Western economies and, in particular, Western cities. Secondly, it is 
a response by Eastern and Western intellectuals and policy-makers to 
new constitutional and economic arrangements in Eastern and Central 
Europe, a search for new spaces to influence public policy from outside 
the state (Taylor 95-96 and Elkin 163-66). 
The meaning of this desired/designed civility has shifted over time. 
Consider changes in the field of development studies, which emerged 
alongside decolonization to render the Third World modern. Develop- 
ment studies placed their faith in devastatingly self-referential forms of 
knowledge which are now in question. It is no longer sustainable to seek 
to replicate a "correct," Anglo-American model in places unfortunate 
enough to be "elsewhere." Andreas Huyssen maintains that one of the 
key distinctions between the modern and the postmodern is the new 
relationship between the West and the Third World, a new relationship 
that is one of respect rather than control, of difference in place of 
hierarchy (615-16). Centralization, modernization and industrializa- 
tion-in fact, development itself-are problematized by dispersal, 
fragmentation and the aesthetic. There is no centre providing the criteria 
by which others are judged up-to-date (Bauman 799-800 and Folch- 
Serra 66-67). Under postmodernity, for example, European historiog- 
raphy confronts the challenge that "the history of this appendage to the 
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Eurasian continent is no longer world history." Its accounts of an 
industrial proletariat, of the emergence of reason, of the centrality of the 
West, are of "local importance" (Ankersmit 150). Max Weber's 
argument that the West developed in terms of a "rational potential" 
which is of the essence of human existence may now be seen to refer to 
specific rationalities inscribed in culturally particular technologies of 
the subject; the universalisms of modernity have been supplanted by the 
localisms of the postmodern, ironic reactions to globalized cultural 
forms (Hindess 124). While some resuscitated liberal tropes maintain an 
individualistic basis in citizenship, communitarian political philosophy 
emphasizes collective participation. But as Chantal Mouffe insists, this 
collectivity must equally be recognized for the proliferation of publics 
that constitute it, publics that were denied by the Enlightenment's 
effortless ethnocentric and androcentric extrapolations from an 
"undifferentiated concept of 'man.' "(29-30 and Fraser 66-67). For 
Etienne Balibar, though, critical questions remain unanswered follow- 
ing the installation of the subject by Descartes and Kant into the heart 
of social and cultural theory: can human subjection be ended by the 
advent of the citizen? Did the rupturous events of 1789 and 1989 
represent a genuine break with domination, a departure from eras of 
absolutism that brought with it the desire and the capacity to understand 
and influence events of government ("Citizen Subject" 39-41)? 
Or put another way, do the foundational innovations of modernity 
offer universally applicable techniques of freedom and being? For 
despite the changes noted above, the West's "local" history clearly 
continues to be made the centre of many political and cultural typologies. 
This much is evident from the resilience of doctrines of civil society. 
More than a century ago, Lord Acton defined the task of civil society as 
"the establishment of liberty for the realization of moral duties" 
(Dalberg-Acton 298). Compare that with Michael Walzer's argument 
that " [t] he words 'civil society' mean the space of uncoerced human 
association and also the set of relational networks-formed for the sake 
of family, faith, interest, and ideology-that fill this space" (293). The 
latter is essentially a pluralized, institutional specification of the former. 
This raises a further series of questions about what Althusser calls 
the "problem oforigins" ("Montesquieu" 25). Which came first: the 
state legitimized by a mythic social contract between state and citizenry, 
or the public forming that citizenry? Can a public exist without a state? 
When does a citizen become a citizen? What is "the nature of the act by 
which a people is a people?" ("Rousseau" 125). These questions are 
especially important at a moment when constitutional and economic 
adjustments are underway in states that have, perhaps for the first time, 
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been exposed to the workings of civil society and when those states, 
which have long enjoyed all these systems, are unable to combine them 
with a general public goodwill. 
To return, then, to Balibar's concerns about subjection, we might 
halt for a moment and consider how that process works within citizen- 
ship and how citizenship relates to the broader patterns of cultural life. 
Rather than being a point in past time that can be isolated, the 
"primordial moment" that "has made a people a people . . . is the 
always contemporary 'moment,' " contemporary for Althusser be- 
cause it is always being re-invented in accordance with the enunciation 
of an object termed the "general interest" by the state. This enunciative 
form relies on a mythic "general will" for its legitimacy and pretends 
that the latter preceded it (Althusser, "Rousseau" 148). 
Althusser argues that the "category of the citizen realizes the 
synthesis ofthe State in man himself the citizen is the State in the private 
man" ("Montesquieu" 62). This is the technology that ensures subjects 
see themselves-and willingly-as such by producing a "disposition" 
on their part. They do not so much accept the imposition of a particular 
form of government as actively embrace it as a collective expression of 
themselves (despite the fact that this expression derived from pre- 
conditions for knowledge set by the state). Virtue is defined as "the 
passion for the general" under democracy in a way that derives from 
self-regard. Self and society are merged (Althusser, "Montesquieu" 45 
and 80). Citizenship involves membership in a community and there- 
fore political participation in the running of that community. This 
implies a doctrine of rights that are granted on a broadly based, social 
level but, paradoxically, actually operate individually in such areas as 
freedom of association, speech, information, and personal liaison (Held 
20-21). These rights are granted by a state which also polices their 
exercise through the doctrine of e pluribus unum. In the words of Alain 
Touraine, this doctrine requires the citizen to forge a direct link between 
"the defence of his ideas and interests and the laws or political decisions 
providing the basic framework for public life" (260-61). It is to Foucault 
that we should turn for the micropolitics of this identification. 
For Foucault, the special feature of the development of government 
in the West has been its deployment of "pastoral power" modelled on 
the Christian church. This power has four qualities. Firstly, it promises 
an ultimate salvation. Secondly, it denies any needs of its own other than 
to serve. Thirdly, it undertakes to care for both the collective and the 
singular self. And finally, it demands an intimacy with those under its 
care. It must know them if it is to direct them. This knowledge must be 
absolute, its computation a critical production of the truth of the person, 
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a truth that can only be known inside this mode of subjection. No longer 
ecclesiastical, this power has multiplied as it has dispersed over the 
centuries into a "modern matrix of individualization[:] . . . the state" 
("The Subject" 782-83). The notion of a legitimacy attached to both 
private and public opinion founded on individual rationality best 
expresses and codifies those ideas of natural rights which become the 
mechanism binding the subject to the state (Wagner and Zipprian 57). 
The social contract is a myth enabling not class domination, but a system 
of integrating the activities of governing. It provides the link between 
the state's model of governance (the family) and its model of legitimacy 
(sovereignty), a means of combining managerial efficacy with legality. 
These two aims are further connected through revisions to their internal 
workings: the family is turned from a mere model to an instrument of 
government, a means of dealing with questions of population (health, 
housing and education). Sovereignty becomes a double move, both a 
technique of political theory and an aim of improvement. The people 
legitimize the government, even as the government improves the people 
(Foucault 16-17). 
Now, salvation can be made contemporary, no longer deferred for 
the duration. It is a bodily salvation, a promise of health, affluence and 
safety. The inunediacy of this salvation necessitates many and varied 
forms of bureaucratic pastoral innovation and reformism, in areas such 
as policing, doctoring and mothering. And knowledge is now deployed 
towards twin ends. Firstly, the broad social body of the population is an 
object of curiosity and interrogation. It is to be measured, to be rendered 
calculable both in overall statistical collection and also via extrapola- 
tions from sampling. Secondly, the individual body is similarly an object 
of care by virtue of various forms of analysis that explain how and to what 
ends it is singular and how its specificities can be accounted for and 
tended to, even as they are put to work within a general system of social 
improvement (Foucault, "Subject" 784). So attempts to understand the 
male public mind will find "the level of wife, self and dream . . . most 
significant" as sources of truth (1-larrisson 368). We must all confess if 
we are to uncover personal meaning, a truth that is trained into us as we 
become cultural subjects through the operation of social welfare and a 
training in the humanities. This is the mission of the state to "gain 
access to the bodies of individuals," a pre-condition of what Foucault 
calls "obtaining productive service from individuals" in a way that is 
"more efficient and less expensive" than force ("Truth and Power" 41 
and 37). This mission "teaches caring as a moral disposition" (Ignatieff 
68). Less poetically, we can discern a re-statement of Rousseau's 
insistence that citizens become "accustomed to regard their individu- 
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ality only in its relation to the body of the State" in order to ensure that 
they "identify themselves in some degree with this greater whole" 
(135). 
The Site of the Subject 
This is where non-humanist bearings can be a useful corrective to 
celebrations of citizenship. Althusser problematizes the pre-existing 
foundational subject of conventional social theory (Stratton 250). What 
was once an ontology of the subject becomes something to be explained 
and situated, not uncovered as a transcendental truth. It is now condi- 
tional, dependent on the topography of the particular social surface 
where it resides. For Foucault: "One has to dispense with the constituent 
subject . . . to attain an analysis which can account for the constitution 
of the subject within the historical texture . . . that is, a form of history 
which accounts for the constitution of knowledges [savoirs], discourses, 
domains of objects" ("Truth" 35). But unlike Foucault, Althusser 
situates this history of the technology of the subject within a broad social 
map. 
He provides the following formulation of Marxism as social theory. 
The economic base is comprised of the productive forces and the 
relations of production. Its superstructure is comprised of the law and 
the state plus ideology, which in turn is comprised of religion, ethics and 
politics. One can understand the social order, then, as a place or 
building. Althusser develops the metaphor of base (or infrastructure, or 
substructure) and superstructure. This has become extremely influen- 
tial, both because of its immediate analytic neatness and because certain 
ofits tropes are shared by Althusser and Foucault, specifically Althusser's 
sense that "[a] topography represents in a definite space the respective 
sites occupied by several realities" ("Ideology" 129 n.5). Foucault 
makes a metaphor of "the site" to found his material history of 
discourses (Archaeology 51). This sense of the site, of a social surface, 
is integral to the account both men give of the formation of subjectivities. 
It would be spurious to seek to map Althusser onto Foucault, given 
the latter's attenuated relationship to Marxism. But for all the fashion- 
able opposition of Foucault to Althusser, of relevance to obsolescence, 
much of the latter's work is still important, albeit at times prone to 
opacity, error and alienation.' To understand Foucault's accounts of 
culture and society, it is necessary both to understand how they can be 
constructed away from doctrines of the sovereign subject and how 
dialectical reasoning can be re-disposed from a single movement of 
history towards a site-specific analysis. Both these precepts seem to 
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derive from Althusser (McHugh 96). We recall here Foucault's sugges- 
tion that one "open Althusser's books" and Althusser's rather sharp 
contention that "[h]e was a pupil of mine," and "something from my 
writings has passed into his," whilst acknowledging the specificity and 
brilliance of Foucault's "own philosophical personality" (Foucault, 
"The Discourse" 14 and Althusser, For Marx 256). Consider, for 
instance, Althusser's valorization of Cremonini's depiction of the 
relations between objects and "their" people. This relies on the 
impossibility of absolute self-recognition and encourages a concentra- 
tion on the multitude of relations that forms a historiographical appre- 
hension in the viewer (Althusser, "Cremonini" 210, 213 and 218). For 
Linda Hutcheon, this work of Althusser's becomes a critical influence 
on postmodernist art works (108 and 133-34). Similarly, when asked his 
opinion of the film of I, Pierre Riviere, Foucault praised the practice of 
today's peasants acting the part of peasants from another historical time, 
not because of some purchase on authenticity, or as a means of 
perceiving one's class past. Rather, the value lay in the peasants 
representing themselves and their history back to themselves ("I, 
Pierre" 133-36). There is a significant link between the two men in their 
views on the relations between subjects, material objects, representa- 
tion, and the hermeneutic keys used to decipher these relations. Some 
of this connection clearly derived from their pedagogic relationship; as 
Foucault put it, "I followed" (Remarks 55). 
Of course, there are significant differences as well. For Althusser, 
the idea of philosophy is to put reality into knowledge; for Foucault, the 
two are always already imbricated. Where Althusser traces a path of 
investigation that goes backwards from facts to a problematic, on to an 
underpinning ideology, and thence to the real, Foucault's movement 
takes him from statements to their preconditions, on to a discursive 
formation, and thence to the archive. These are parallel movements, but 
only Althusser privileges the real as knowable and actionable despite the 
lack of fit between things and words. For Foucault, language in the 
contemporary world is less an unfortunate veil drawn over perfect 
knowledge than a signifying system of difference and sameness that 
itself decides the conditions of any inquiry after the appearance of a gap 
between signs and signifiers, whilst carving out its own rental area by 
inscribing the necessity of undertaking such inquiries (Brown 147-49, 
151 and 156). 
There is a certain happy Whiggish teleology to the personal 
narrative of conversion often related by those who have travelled from 
Althusser to Foucault. Where once these true believers were sidelined 
in a detour of theoreticist purity, now they have renounced this unnec- 
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essary move in favour of a non-conspiratorial, chaotic politics allegedly 
associated with Foucault. Such shifts are often also marked by the re- 
installation of the subject and a politics of humanistic identity. Maybe 
this is as much a caricature on my part as it is an enthymeme of the 
conversi. But there is a clear denial of other reasons animating this 
trajectory from one "dead white theorist" to another, a denial that does 
a particular disservice to the rejected first term in the progression. 
In film theory, which I teach, it has even been claimed that we have 
seen a direct transition from Althusser to Foucault as providers of the 
discipline's "political underpinning" (Lapsley and Westlake 18). This 
neglects the importance, inter alia, of feminist psychoanalysis and post- 
colonialist discourse as forms of screen politics, but they, too have been 
subject to a Foucault-effect, and were also influenced by the Althusserian 
introduction to Lacan as well as Christian Metz's shift into the psy- 
complexes. In literature, we can see a more chaotic and compelling 
trajectory "simply" in work appearing under the name of Terry 
Eagleton. Criticism and Ideology, routinely held up as his Althusserian 
moment, contains the necessary critique of Althusser (once a sign of 
membership). A few years later, his survey text Literary Theory 
acknowledges the disrepute into which Althusser's work has fallen, and 
announces itself to be very much under the sign of Foucault. In The 
Ideology of the Aesthetic, these two figures are in a still more jumbled 
relation (Criticism and Ideology 83-84, Literary Theory 173 and 134 
and The Ideology 88 and 351). There is a similarly cosmic ambivalence 
in the practitioners of cultural studies, Stuart Hall asking almost 
wistfully why it became infra dig to mention Althusser "in polite 
socialist company in Britain" (The Hard Road 188). And consider 
Slavoj Zizek's post-Lacanian lament on these matters: 
There is something enigmatic in the sudden eclipse of the 
Althusserian school: it cannot be explained away in terms of a 
theoretical defeat. --It is more as if it were, in Althusser's theory, 
a traumatic kernel which had to be quickly forgotten, "repressed"; 
it is an effective case of theoretical amnesia. (1) 
Zizek was trying to uncover why the grand debate about the 
efficacy of the modern and its project of openness was being conducted 
via an opposition of Habermas and Foucault, thereby sublimating the 
unconscious. Whilst this paper is not animated by a need to identify the 
unsaid as a means of establishing its credentials, it is undeniably 
significant that Althusser's combination of anti-humanism and psycho- 
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analysis became the unspeakable when both those other terms carried 
on successful, if somewhat separate, careers. 
In any case, there remains some value in Althusser's material trope 
of an edifice founded on the economy, above which resides the visible, 
diurnal operation of the social. This foundation is a bedrock which must 
exist for the rest of the edifice to stand, "to represent above all the 
`determination in the last instance' by the economic base" ("Ideology" 
130). But away from this "last instance," the superstructure has a 
"relative autonomy" and can even effect a "reciprocal action" onto the 
economy ("Ideology" 136-37). This is surely far-distant from a mecha- 
nistic Marxist functionalism incapable of discerning the nuances of 
cultural life or allowing for difference. We can also see some interesting 
links with Foucault's concern with space as a metaphor and a site. The 
site of concern for social theory must, for him, be on the surface. His 
fairly minimal and passing attention to economics made this level the 
most poignant in his work. 
The state is a critical component of this social surface. But its 
meaning varies for the two theorists. In Althusser's writings, it has two 
chief characteristics. The first involves the use of force and its threat as 
a means of ensuring loyalty. This characteristic comprises the bureau- 
cracy, the courts, the prisons, the police and the armed services, their 
work done by sanction and interdiction. This is "the (repressive) State 
apparatus" ((R)SA). The second characteristic is the "Ideological State 
Apparatuses" (ISAs). These include teaching and ecclesiastical insti- 
tutions, the family, labour organizations, politics and the communica- 
tions and cultural ISAs. So where there is a unified (R)SA, there are 
multifarious ISAs, many of which inhabit, at least in part, what is 
routinely figured as the "private domain." Althusser explains away 
these public-private distinctions as "internal to bourgeois law," law 
which the (R)SA is outside because it exercises a monopoly over 
"legitimate" force. Violence is the essence of the (R)SA, whereas ISAs 
"function by ideology." Ideology may inform the (R)SA, but it is not 
as important as force. The ISAs may in their turn use force, but it will 
always be secondary to ideology as an influence on them (Althusser, 
"Ideology" 130). 
We might return briefly here to the question of conversion and the 
autobiography of ideas, to the case of Stuart Hall. It is somewhat ironic 
that Hall's critiques of Althusser for functionalism, and Foucault for a 
"gospel of absolute diversity," are set so close together (Hall, "The 
Toad in the Garden" 46-48, 52). Perhaps this occurs because there is a 
methodological kernel of contradiction in Althusser--that we are all 
caught in ideology, that ideology is essential as a grout cementing 8
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societies into security, and that there is an antinomy to ideology, going 
under the name of science-which is brought out when read against the 
detailed historical specificity, and rejection of a non-signifying ground 
of truth, offered by Foucault. 
Jim Collins argues that whilst Foucault's account of power empha- 
sizes a dispersal of power and counter-power, its best evocation-the 
use of Bentham's panoptic fantasy as a synecdoche for relations of 
power-operates via the same centralized notion of a cultural apparatus 
as the ISA model: susceptible to contradiction, but highly organized as 
well (28-29). This can be made to meet Anthony Giddens' contention 
that the essence of modernity is the organization by the social system 
of "time and space" through culture (14). Hence my use of the term 
"surface" even as the metaphor ofbase and superstructure is mobilized. 
This then provides the means for conceptualizing the circulation of 
discourses and the formation of subjectivities within the sphere of 
governance in a way that can position such practices sometimes 
alongside capital and its critical economic role and sometimes quite 
separate from it. This serves to keep a hold on meta-recits whilst 
enlisting Foucault to make them serviceable. My own view is that the 
antithesis set up between Foucault and Marx is spurious, based as it must 
be upon a conventionalist understanding of author-functions. Which 
Marx and which Foucault can thus be opposed? For example, Foucault 
drew extensively from Marx in his ideas about harnessing productivity 
and the construction of homologies between military and civic training 
("docile bodies"), where the division of labour is compared with the 
organization of infantrymen. Discipline and Punish has many Marxist 
features in its model of the development of disciplinary power inside 
capitalism. Foucault's principal quibble with Marx and the true believ- 
ers lay in their propensity to devote untold energy to conceptualizing 
"class" to the comparative exclusion of an adequate theorization of 
"struggle "; he complained that this second half of the grand dialectical 
couplet received less than equal treatment. And for all these thinkers, 
the problem with the public-private divide remains critical. The divide 
is so important because it affords the state the task of policing the 
ownership of property and the management of people (Foucault, 
Discipline 163, 169, 175 and 221-23; Foucault, "The End" 154; and 
Balibar, "Tais-Toi" 2). This is increasingly significant given the 
methodological and political individualism of the rational consumer 
side to both the revived interest in citizenship and neo-classical econom- 
ics. But even these discourses form the public in accordance with their 
own logics of subjectivity. Foucault's legacy is to show that the best 
means of understanding such kinds is not to compare them with the 
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overall performance of accumulating capital, but to consider them as 
rules that are deployed as a means of managing populations. 
Foucault sees a grievous reductionism in Marxist accounts of the 
subject. Subjection may be occasioned by the circumstances of produc- 
tion, class or ideology, but this is not to state that these are always and 
everywhere the "more fundamental mechanisms." He argues instead 
for a circularity in their relationship to modes of subjection, referring to 
the increase in size and reach of the political domain of governance over 
the past five hundred years. The success of the state's attempts to manage 
populations is seen to derive from two sources. The loci and logic of its 
power are not merely to be found amongst the interests or persuasions 
of the class that controls it because it operates at a micro level as well 
as at the totalizing level of general economic forces ("Subject" 782). 
This micro level depends upon the formation of various kinds of public 
subject. The determining logics of those subjects may not necessarily 
provide intelligible accounts of action if they are always led back to the 
economic. In fact, the path of research that works with ideology may be 
said to pre-suppose the conventional idealist subject of philosophy 
imbued with a consciousness ready to be worked on ("Body" 58). 
Foucault stresses the importance of distinguishing between rela- 
tions ofpower, relations of communication, and "objective capacities." 
Power transforms the material world. Communication gives that world 
meaning through semiotic exchange. And the "capacities" decide 
inequality and domination. Each is mutually imbricated with the others, 
but not in a coordinated or consistent way that would make for an 
equilibrium. Different sites will have different points to their connec- 
tion. Each sphere frequently operates by its own rules and regularities 
("Subject" 786-87 and "Questions" 5). 
Other developments since Althusser have problematized his find- 
ings about who controls the apparatuses of the state and whose interests 
they serve. The category of class may no longer be serviceable. Leaving 
to one side alternative accounts of class, derived from self-apportion- 
ment ofattributes through questionnaire sociology or position within the 
labour market, the Marxist tradition itself offers discontinuities in this 
area (for non-Marxist accounts, see Inkeles 83-86, and Weber 180-81). 
There is a division between those with property and those without; 
between those with power or authority and those without; between those 
with control of the forces of production (technology) and those without; 
and between persons in differing relationships to a shifting set of 
processes of the production, appropriation and distribution of surplus 
value. It is difficult to find agreement within or between these positions 
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(Resnick and Wolff 2-4). And it is also increasingly awkward to use 
class as a category of identifiable agency. How does a class "act"? 
John Rosenthal tries to recuperate class by arguing that it is quite 
different from a signifier that can be read against a signified in the 
material world. His counter-example is women in a gendered discourse. 
Unlike this subject position, he argues, class is a rather crudely 
theoretical object that does not refer so straightforwardly to a felt social 
identity (30-31). Taking up his point, we might re-dispose the difficulty 
with class onto the broader terrain of signification in order to break open 
these categories and indicate how they might be used methodologically 
rather than organically. 
Consider this alongside Althusser's account of ideology as "a 
Representation' of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their 
Real Conditions of Existence" ("Ideology" 152). He maintains that 
criticizing an ideology, for example religious faith, also presumes that 
this ideology is illusionary but that it at least alludes to reality. It must, 
therefore, have grounds that are both true and germane to itself on which 
it can be criticized: "(ideology = illusion/allusion)." The next presump- 
tion is that the act of interpretation can explain this ("Ideology" 153). 
Althusser argues that this practice gives rise to a query as to the 
sources and reasons for the "imaginary transposition of the real 
conditions of existence." For such a practice of interpretation assumes 
that: 
what is reflected in the imaginary representation of the world found 
in an ideology is the conditions of existence of men, i.e. their real 
world .. . [when] it is not their real conditions of existence, their real 
world that "men" "represent to themselves" in ideology, but 
above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence 
represented to them there. ("Ideology" 153-54) 
This suggests that ideas are material practices, rituals such as the act of 
prayer (material faith in religion) or the payment of a social debt 
(material faith in justice), carried out by the subject at the same time as 
they define that subject. The subject is both hailing and being hailed 
through this set of practices ("Ideology" 158, 160, and 162-64). Not all 
the practices need be compatible, but this may not be a problem unless 
they come into conflict. 
The separation of potentially conflictual spheres, each of which 
may be necessary for the constitution of the ethical subject of liberal- 
capitalist citizenship and the maximising subject of the free market, 
involves a further move, the emergence of a smaller unit of analysis than 11
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the ISA, but one that helps to constitute it. This is what Foucault terms 
"those systems of micro-power that . . . we call the disciplines." 
Liberties and disciplines are the dual inheritance of the Enlightenment, 
whereby the subjection of "forces and bodies" must accompany the 
guarantees of sovereignty. Far from being antithetical to them, 
" [m]echanisms of power" accompany and even guarantee freedoms 
(Discipline 222). Power may silence at times, but it also hails, articulates 
and commands speech. It works to produce truths. It is through the 
training or schooling of the subject achieved under the agency of 
disciplines, for example, that the subject is known (170). Similar 
methods produce a "will to knowledge" (History 73). The appearance 
of categories ofperson produced by forms of knowledge ("the child, the 
patient, the madman, the prisoner") divides people, making them the 
object of understandings that slice them into interiors, exteriors and 
avenues into and out of cohorts. This achievement is to be seen under 
the sign of a "technology of power, " a productive manufacturer of truth: 
" [t] he individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong 
to this production" (History 192 and 194). So the state, while existing 
in a definite structural relationship to citizens, governments, markets 
and the distinctions between these groupings, operates through the work 
of differing knowledges. This is Jacques Donzelot's "provisional 
bracketing" of "state" with "power." Neither exists other than 
relationally, as productive forces doing the work of "activating and 
managing a population" (76-77). 
This understanding is in stark contrast to the two standard logics 
of the state. The social compact and functionalist views argue for a 
unified subject placing sovereignty in it because of a perceived "com- 
munity of interest" (Hindess and Hirst 31). Neo-Marxist accounts, in 
some sense after Althusser, see the state as a set of fractions ultimately 
(but not essentially) dedicated to protecting capital accumulation (Head 
41-42). Both discourses are totalizing, one in its mythic first instance 
(the signing over of sovereignty) and the other in its mythic last instance 
(the servicing of capital). Neither discourse pays sufficient attention to 
the formation of subjects or the politics of culture, despite the fact that 
Althusser pointed in that direction. Rather, the trend is towards 
accounting for the state as a mechanism that elicits obedience from pre- 
existing social actors, and social actors as possessed of pre-significatory 
interests (even if these are not always self-evident) (McQuarie and 
Spaulding 6). 
For Bertrand de Jouvenel, the essence of the state is power (27). 
This power is akin to Bertrand Russell's "production of intended 
effects" (35). Conversely, for pluralist political science "[t]he power 12
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relation is give-and-take" (Lasswell 10). In most such theorizing, 
power is positioned in antinomic relation to knowledge, distorting the 
flow of information (Converse 1-9). The self-styled Radical View of 
Steven Lukes finds that notions of power and the subject are all about 
interests. He proposes a final and conclusive level of its operation when 
"A exercises power over B in a manner contrary to B's interests" (34). 
Power thus offers a unifier for discourses of state and subject, promising 
their union and difference a mutual solidity. Power is produced here as 
a property (Ragins and Sundstrom 51). But it is possible to re-phrase the 
state and power as productive processes, fundamentally unfixed and 
relational in their circulation. 
The Postmodern Cultural Subject 
Just such a re-phrasing became a critical issue amongst the Parisian 
intellectual left in surveying the detritus oflesevenements. For Althusser, 
May 1968 initially seemed to point to the need for a rigorous intellectual 
leadership inside Marxism. Whereas for Foucault, as for the social 
movements that organised in its afterglow, the period spelt an end to the 
vanguard role of the general intellectual, much as modernity had for 
Simmel (Lapsley and Westlake 21). The question cui bono was dis- 
placed by qui parle. Aspects of that question are re-conceived by 
Foucault as "superstructural in relation to a whole series of power 
networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, knowledge, technol- 
ogy and so forth" (Discipline 39). No central field functions as a 
coherent whole determining society. There are not so much determining 
interests as determining formations of interests and subjects to have 
them. Interests, then, are epiphenomenal to the lines of power that form 
them. In reading the shifting loci of power at different sites, Foucault 
chooses not to seek: 
the headquarters that presides over its rationality; neither the caste 
which governs, nor those who make the most important economic 
decisions which direct the entire network of power that functions 
in a society (and makes it function); the rationality of power is 
characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted 
level where they are inscribed. (History 95) 
The discursive tactics of cultural policy, for example, will fre- 
quently be founded on accounts of subjectivity, of how to produce civil 
subjects. And the realm for so doing will be that of conduct, which must 
mean culture if it means more than force. This returns us to Althusser's 13
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anti-idealist account of culture as practice, where, to repeat, the 
physical, material act of prayer actually constitutes belief. There is 
literally nothing below or above it. The logics and loci of power are here 
plural and often discrete, their rationality self-referential and restricted 
to particular inscriptive systems as means of keeping incommensurate 
accounts of the subject apart. Power is, then, not so much John Frow's 
"consolidation of production of all speech" ("Discourse and Power" 
206). Rather, it is the consolidation and dislocation of specific forms of 
speech at specific times. Power produces meanings in a decentred way. 
It demolishes at certain points and constructs at others because its 
burden is to engineer relations between subjects (Foucault, "Subject" 
786). The primary site of this engineering is at the level of governance 
through culture. But culture has been the very domain of significatory 
confusion and indeterminacy under modernity, with its distinctive 
invention of the hermeneutic drive to find instability of meaning even 
as fixity is desired. Under postmodernity, with the economy and culture 
integrated still more intimately and liberal/capitalism (nascent or in 
restoration) in search of actionable technologies to elicit civility, a new 
subject is to be formed with an urgency that cannot permit endless, or 
even minimally delayed, iterability. 
The terrain of meaning that forms the domain of culture has 
undergone significant epistemological and institutional changes over 
time. Foucault has systematized the question of the connection between 
discourse and object in the following terms: 
There is a problem: how can it happen that real things, things that 
are perceived, can come to be articulated by words within a 
discourse. Is it that words impose on us the outline of things, or is 
it that things, through some operation of the subject, come to be 
transcribed on the surface of words[ ?] ("Archeology" 51) 
For governments, posing the problem of meaning in this way is to 
train their subjects into an aestheticized politics of civic identity. We are 
prone to conceive of cultural interpretation in terms of a nineteenth- 
century desire to counteract the anomic, alienating tendencies of 
industrial society that divided human subjects into specialisms, into 
units of work. This sets the humanities and aesthetics in opposition to 
the vocational i sm of the modern, which is seen as a termite-like reaction 
to the problem of the ineffability of the urban sublime. But perhaps the 
displacement of classics by the humanities in the curriculum-a central 
aspect to modernity-established the parameters of a training in 
contemporary civics rather more than it provoked the re-appearance of 
14
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 10
http://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/10
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1342
Miller 111 
a unified subjectivity (Hunter 442-43). The desire to engage in a 
processual system for generating public goodwill was tied from that 
moment to cultural criticism's propensity for generating endless mean- 
ingfulness in texts. This may be seen to have produced a model for 
communicative rationality between readers. Whether or not Habermas' 
association of the free citizen functioning in an ideal speech act ever 
existed materially, its existence as knowledge functions in a formative 
way, troped again and again in the discourses of liberalism and 
citizenship. This troping is more than political philosophy, especially in 
countries that have already industrialized and are moving into service 
industry phases even as the emotional labour component of their 
economies is so lacking from everyday conduct. It provides the founda- 
tion for the form of pedagogic enlightenment that bureaucracies increas- 
ingly engage in, for the production of educational and other cultural 
policies that claim to manufacture self-discovery, autonomy and iden- 
tification; in short, for instruments that take the absence of an originat- 
ing subject as an unspoken given and shore up the state by forming a 
governable subject whose individuality is given through coordinates 
that work for liberal capitalism. This is done in the name of the 
apparently transcendental subject whose free will is magically always 
there but magically has to be formed and re-formed time after time, a 
move that is close to Kierkegaard's frustrations about the discursive 
power of doctrines of: 
"the public," consisting of real individuals who never are and 
never can be united in an actual situation or organization-and yet 
are held together as a whole. The public is a host, more numerous 
than all the peoples together, but it is a body which can never be 
reviewed; it cannot even be represented. (265) 
Cultural policy exists to confirm what is apparently already there. 
Social engineering becomes social conservation. But there is a contra- 
diction. Whilst postmodernity may be "defined entirely by absences," 
it calls up a sense of loss of something never had (Bauman 793-94). This 
leads to a plenitude of representations- -and hence formations-of 
publics and their appropriate conduct. The postmodern acts in the name 
of the ontic despite the fact that it has substituted for the latter (Brown 
188-97). For the postmodern is nostalgic for a historically ramified and 
derived meaning (Huyssen 613). Ironically, this means that, at the level 
of policy, the state is enabled to instantiate the new as the already extant, 
precisely by virtue of what Fredric Jameson calls "an age that has 
forgotten how to think historically" (ix). Foucault historicizes and 
15
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renders specific the varied levels of determination that are coming to 
organize these new social structures. 
In his rather wistful meditation on Althusser's passing (admittedly, 
one in a long line of summative accounts by male academics that fail to 
mention Althusser's murder of his wife), Ted Benton makes some 
extremely valuable points about Althusser as a counterforce to dogma. 
This may appear strange to people reared on a heritage of British or 
Australian social theory in particular, where teenage Althusserians 
were long regarded as Young Turks in search of flesh to consume. But 
there is a kernel of truth in the statement. By the late 1970s, Althusser 
knew that any hope for a science of Marxism could not be sustained 
under the existing apparatus of State Socialism. And more than that, he 
was pointing to the beginnings of a restive civil society in the Eastern 
bloc (117-23). But he also knew that every social formation required "a 
distinctive kind of cement that assures the adjustment and cohesion of 
men in their roles, their functions and their social relations" (Althusser, 
"Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation" 25). A 
revised Althusserian framework that borrows in a non-mechanistic way 
from his account of the subject, the site and the state can help us to re- 
think our present past and re-think the foundational myth of the social 
contract. 1989 marked the death of State Socialism, not the theory of the 
subject that Althusser ushered in and Foucault fleshed out. 
Notes 
1. Some parts of this argument appear in The Well-Tempered Self Citizen- 
ship, Culture, and the Postmodern Subject. Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1993. 
2. A representative critique from within sociology is contained in R. W. 
Connell, 98-139. For summations of the intersection of Althusser and screen 
theory, see Robert Lapsley and Michael Westlake, 13-18 and Dudley 
Andrew, 118-19. The continuing influence is traced and exemplified in the 
domain of literature in John Frow, Marxism and Literary History, 22-35. The 
use of interpellation is also in evidence in John Fiske, 176-78. 
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